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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal involves a constitutional challenge to an 
electronic surveillance program operated by the National 
Security Agency (NSA) under the authority of Section 702 of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Elliott 
Schuchardt appeals an order of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing his 
civil action for lack of jurisdiction. The District Court held 
that Schuchardt lacked standing to sue because he failed to 
plead facts from which one might reasonably infer that his 
own communications had been seized by the federal 
government. Because we hold that, at least as a facial matter, 
Schuchardt’s second amended complaint plausibly stated an 
injury in fact personal to him, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order and remand.  
 I 
Schuchardt’s appeal is the latest in a line of cases 
raising the question of a plaintiff’s standing to challenge 
surveillance authorized by Section 702. Congress amended 
FISA in 2008 to “supplement[] pre-existing FISA authority 
by creating a new framework under which the Government 
may . . . target[] the communications of non-U.S. persons 
located abroad.” Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 133 
S. Ct. 1138, 1144 (2013); see also FISA Amendments Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110–261, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438, 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1881a. On the day Section 702 became law, its 
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constitutionality was challenged by “attorneys and human 
rights, labor, legal, and media organizations whose work 
allegedly require[d] them to engage in . . . telephone and e-
mail communications” with persons located outside the 
United States. See id. at 1145. The Clapper plaintiffs claimed 
that Section 702 was facially unconstitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches 
and seizures. See id. at 1146. 
A 
The dispositive question presented to the Supreme 
Court in Clapper was whether the plaintiffs had established 
an “imminent” injury “fairly traceable” to the government’s 
conduct under Section 702. See 133 S. Ct. at 1147. Because 
the plaintiffs had brought suit on the day the law was enacted, 
there was no evidence that their communications had been 
intercepted—there was only a looming “threat of [future] 
surveillance.” Id. at 1145–46. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs 
claimed they had standing because there was an “objectively 
reasonable likelihood” that their communications would be 
intercepted based on the nature of their contacts with persons 
outside of the country. Id at 1146. 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument as 
“inconsistent” with longstanding precedent requiring that 
“threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute 
injury in fact,” Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S 149, 158 
(1990)). And because the plaintiffs could rely only on a 
“speculative chain of possibilities” to support their allegations 
of future harm from unlawful government surveillance, they 
failed to demonstrate an injury that was “certainly 
impending.” Id. at 1150.  
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In particular, the Court characterized the Clapper 
plaintiffs’ “speculative chain” as entailing five inferential 
leaps: 
(1) the Government will decide to target the 
communications of non-U.S. persons with 
whom [the plaintiffs] communicate; 
(2) in doing so, the Government will choose to 
invoke its authority under [Section 702] rather 
than . . . another method of surveillance; 
(3) the Article III judges who serve on the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court will 
conclude that the Government’s proposed 
surveillance procedures . . . satisfy [Section 
702’s] many safeguards and are consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment; 
(4) the Government will succeed in intercepting 
the communications of [the plaintiffs’] contacts; 
and  
(5) [the plaintiffs] will be parties to the 
particular communications that the Government 
intercepts. 
133 S. Ct. at 1148.  
 On summary judgment, the plaintiffs had failed to “set 
forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts” supporting 
these inferences. Id. at 1149 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Accordingly, they lacked standing to challenge the 




Soon after Clapper was decided, former NSA 
contractor Edward Snowden leaked a trove of classified 
documents to journalists writing for the Washington Post and 
Guardian.1 Those documents referenced the existence of an 
NSA program engaged in the bulk collection of domestic 
telephone metadata, i.e., “details about telephone calls, 
including for example, the length of a call, the phone number 
from which the call was made, and the phone number called,” 
but not the voice content of the call itself. ACLU v. Clapper, 
785 F.3d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Smith v. Obama, 
816 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 2016); Obama v. Klayman, 800 
F.3d 559, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The operational parameters of 
the program were summarized in a classified order of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) directed at 
Verizon Business Network Services. ACLU, 785 F.3d at 795. 
In short, based on Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 
Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq.), Verizon was producing 
to the government, “all call detail records or ‘telephony 
metadata’ . . . on all telephone calls made through its systems 
or using its services where one or both ends of the call are 
located in the United States.” ACLU, 785 F.3d at 795.  
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Verizon Providing All 
Call Records to U.S. Under Court Order, Wash. Post (June 6, 
2013), https://perma.cc/LZK7-37CJ; see also Glenn 
Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of 




The government’s bulk collection of telephone 
metadata precipitated a number of lawsuits. In one case, the 
Second Circuit held that the government had exceeded its 
statutory authority under Section 215 to obtain “relevant” 
information by constructing an “all-encompassing” database 
of “every telephone call made or received in the United 
States.” ACLU, 785 F.3d at 812–13. Under the statute’s 
sunset provision, however, authorization for the bulk 
telephone metadata collection program expired on June 1, 
2015. See Pub. L. No. 112–14, 125 Stat. 216 (2011) 
(authorizing an extension); Smith, 816 F.3d at 1241. And 
although the program was subsequently reauthorized by the 
USA FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114–23, 129 Stat. 268 
(2015), that act “prohibits any further bulk collection.” Smith, 
816 F.3d at 1241. In reliance on that prohibition, the Ninth 
Circuit has determined that “claims related to the ongoing 
collection of metadata [under Section 215] are [now] moot.” 
Id. 
Separate and apart from the bulk collection of 
telephone metadata under Section 215, the documents leaked 
to the Washington Post and Guardian also shed light on a 
previously undisclosed electronic surveillance program 
operating under Section 702 called PRISM.2 Slides from a 
presentation purportedly authored by the NSA described 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S. 
British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet 
Companies in Broad Secret Program, Wash. Post (June 7, 
2013), https://perma.cc/YJU2-U9TZ; Glenn Greenwald & 
Ewan MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data 




PRISM as “collect[ing] directly from the servers” the full 
content of user communications exchanged using services 
provided by several large U.S. companies—including 
Microsoft, Google, Yahoo, Apple, and Facebook. App. 53. 
Another slide depicted a timeline showing the inception of 
PRISM collection from each company, beginning with 
Microsoft in September 2007 and ending with Apple in 
October 2012. Yet another slide suggested a slogan for the 
NSA’s “New Collection Posture”: “Sniff it All, Know it All, 
Collect it All, Process it All, Exploit it All, and Partner it 
All.” App. 61.  
II 
On June 2, 2014, Schuchardt filed a complaint in the 
District Court asserting constitutional, statutory, and state law 
claims against the President, the Director of National 
Intelligence, and the Directors of the NSA and Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. He alleged that the Government was 
violating the Fourth Amendment by storing his confidential 
communications “in a computer database, or through a 
government program, which the Defendants call ‘Prism.’” 
Civil Complaint ¶ 22, Schuchardt v. Obama, No. 2-14-cv-
00705-CB (W.D. Pa. June 2, 2014), ECF No. 1. He sought to 
enjoin “the [Government] from engaging in any further 
collection of . . . [his] information.” Id. ¶ 37. 
Schuchardt responded to the Government’s successive 
motions to dismiss by amending his complaint twice. In 
addition to refining and expanding his allegations, Schuchardt 
supplemented his averments with exhibits, the contents of 
which fall into two general categories. First, he supported his 
allegations regarding PRISM with excerpts of the classified 
materials that were the focus of the Washington Post and 
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Guardian reports, as well as several of the reports themselves. 
Second, he included affidavits filed in support of the plaintiffs 
in Jewel v. NSA (Jewel I), 965 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 
2013), a case challenging the NSA’s interception of internet 
traffic flowing through a telecommunications facility in San 
Francisco pursuant to an Executive Order issued shortly after 
September 11, 2001. Id. at 1098. Jewel I was decided on 
remand from Jewel v. NSA, 673 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2011), in 
which the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had adequately 
pleaded Article III standing to sue. See 673 F.3d at 913. The 
affidavits in Jewel I were filed by former NSA employees 
who asserted that the agency had, since September 11, 
developed an expansive view of its own surveillance 
authority and the technology to back it up. See, e.g., App. 126 
(“The post-September 11 approach was that NSA could 
circumvent federal statutes and the Constitution as long as 
there was some visceral connection to looking for terrorists. . 
. . [The NSA] has, or is in the process of obtaining, the 
capability to seize and store most electronic communications 
passing through its U.S. intercept centers.”).3  
                                                 
3 Schuchardt’s second amended complaint also 
asserted: a Fourth Amendment claim challenging the bulk 
collection of telephone metadata under Section 215, App. 99 
(Count II); a Pennsylvania state-law claim, App. 100 (Count 
III), and a First Amendment claim, App. 101 (Count IV), 
challenging both PRISM and the telephone metadata 
program; and statutory claims under FISA seeking injunctive 
relief, App. 103 (Count V), and damages, App. 104 (Count 
VI). At oral argument, Schuchardt belatedly conceded that his 
claims regarding the bulk collection of telephone metadata 
were mooted by the USA FREEDOM Act. See Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 5, Schuchardt v. Obama, No. 15-3491 (3d 
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Based on the record he had compiled, Schuchardt’s 
second amended complaint alleged that because the 
Government was “intercepting, monitoring and storing the 
content of all or substantially all of the e-mail sent by 
American citizens,” his own online communications had been 
seized in the dragnet. App. 82, 95–99 (emphasis added). In 
particular, Schuchardt asserted that he was “a consumer of 
various types of electronic communication, storage, and 
internet services,” including “the e-mail services provided by 
Google and Yahoo; the internet search services of Google; the 
cloud storage services provided by Google and Dropbox; 
[and] the e-mail and instant message services provided by 
Facebook.” App. 95–96. Then, relying on the operational 
details of PRISM made public by the Washington Post and 
Guardian, he alleged that: (1) the Government “had obtained 
direct access to the servers” of the companies providing him 
with these services; (2) the Government was “unlawfully 
intercepting, accessing, monitoring and/or storing [his] 
private communications . . . made or stored through such 
services”; and (3) the Government was “collecting such 
information in order to ‘data mine’ the nation’s e-mail 
database.” App. 84, 95–97.  
                                                                                                             
Cir. May 17, 2016). He also agreed that his claim for 
monetary damages under FISA was barred by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, and that he was no longer pursuing his 
claims under the First Amendment. Id. at 10–11. In light of 
Schuchardt’s concessions, we do not address these issues, and 
focus solely on whether he has standing to litigate his Fourth 
Amendment claim for injunctive relief based on the 
Government’s alleged bulk collection of online 
communications under PRISM, App. 95 (Count I). 
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In its motion to dismiss Schuchardt’s second amended 
complaint, the Government principally took issue with his 
allegation that the “NSA collects the online communications . 
. . of all Americans, including, therefore, his.” See Brief in 
Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second 
Amended Complaint at 2, Schuchardt v. Obama, No. 2-14-
cv-00705-CB (W.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2014), ECF No. 21 
(emphasis added). Specifically, the Government argued that 
because Section 702 authorizes the targeted surveillance of 
only persons outside the United States, it was implausible that 
PRISM—a program operating under the authority of Section 
702—was a dragnet capturing all the country’s domestic 
online communications. In support of its position, the 
Government cited a report on PRISM prepared by the Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB),4 an 
independent agency tasked with “review[ing] actions the 
executive branch takes to protect the Nation from terrorism, 
ensuring that the need for such actions is balanced with the 
need to protect privacy and civil liberties.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000ee(c)(1). Based on its review, the PCLOB determined 
that “[i]n PRISM collection, the government . . . sends 
selectors—such as an email address—to a United States-
based electronic communications service provider,” who is 
then by law “compelled to give the communications sent to or 
from that selector to the government.” PCLOB Report at 33. 
Far from being the dragnet that Schuchardt had alleged, 
                                                 
4 Privacy & Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on 
the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (July 2, 2014), 
available at https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf 
[hereinafter PCLOB Report]. 
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therefore, “PRISM collection under Section 702 may be 
targeted only at non-U.S. persons located abroad who possess 
or are likely to receive foreign-intelligence information.” 
Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 10, 
Schuchardt v. Obama, No. 2-14-cv-00705-CB (W.D. Pa. 
Aug. 11, 2014), ECF No. 8. Because none of Schuchardt’s 
allegations suggested that he or his associates would be 
targeted as such persons, the Government argued that he had 
failed to include “well-pleaded allegations and non-
conclusory allegations of fact” necessary to establish his 
standing. Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint at 4, Schuchardt v. 
Obama, No. 2-14-cv-00705-CB (W.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2014), 
ECF No. 21. 
The District Court granted the Government’s motion to 
dismiss Schuchardt’s second amended complaint, but took a 
slightly different tack than what the Government had 
suggested. After considering four cases examining 
constitutional standing to sue in cases challenging national 
security surveillance—Clapper, ACLU, Jewel, and 
Klayman—the Court deduced a “meaningful distinction” that 
explained their divergent outcomes. Schuchardt v. Obama, 
2015 WL 5732117, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2015). “In 
situations where plaintiffs are able to allege with some degree 
of particularity that their own communications were 
specifically targeted—for example by citing a leaked FISC 
order or relying on a detailed insider account—courts have 
concluded that the particularity requirement has been 
satisfied.” Id. “On the other hand, courts have refused to find 
standing based on naked averments that an individual’s 
communications must have been seized because the 
government operates a data collection program and the 
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individual utilized the service of a large telecommunications 
company.” Id.  
Applying the pleading standard it had gleaned from 
Clapper, ACLU, Jewel, and Klayman, the District Court 
began by noting that the facts underpinning Schuchardt’s 
allegations were drawn almost entirely from “media reports 
and publicly available information.” Id. Accordingly, his 
lawsuit fell “squarely within the second category” of cases, 
i.e., those brought by plaintiffs who lacked Article III 
standing. Id. Furthermore, Schuchardt “had identified no facts 
from which the Court reasonably might infer that his own 
communications have been targeted, seized, or stored.” Id. As 
such, he was “indistinguishable from every other American 
subscribing to the services of a major telephone and/or 
internet service provider.” Id. His “only discernible 
distinction [was] his heightened personal-interest in the 
subject,” which was “insufficient to confer standing.” Id. 
(citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 
U.S. 208, 220 (1974)). 
III 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Schuchardt’s 
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as well as the inherent power 
to ascertain its own jurisdiction. See Arbaugh v. Y. & H. 
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. See also Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. 
Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541–42 (1986). We review de novo the 
District Court’s order dismissing Schuchardt’s second 
amended complaint. See Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 
F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).  
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At the outset, we note that there is an important 
distinction between “facial” and “factual” attacks on subject 
matter jurisdiction raised in a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Mortensen v. First 
Fed. Sav. & Loan, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). In a 
facial attack, we review only “the allegations of the complaint 
and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gould Elecs. v. United 
States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). If, however, the 
defendant contests the pleaded jurisdictional facts, “the court 
must permit the plaintiff to respond with evidence supporting 
jurisdiction.” Id. at 177 (citing Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & 
Aerospace Workers v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 673 F.2d 700, 711–
12 (3d Cir. 1982)). “The court may then determine 
jurisdiction by weighing the evidence presented by the 
parties,” but “if there is a dispute of a material fact, the court 
must conduct a plenary trial on the contested facts prior to 
making a jurisdictional determination.” Id.  
It is clear from the record in this case that the District 
Court viewed the Government’s motion to dismiss as a facial 
attack on its jurisdiction. The Court’s analysis focused solely 
on Schuchardt’s second amended complaint; it did not 
consider any extrinsic facts proffered by the Government, 
including, for example, the nature of PRISM collection as 
determined by the PCLOB. See Schuchardt, 2015 WL 
5732117, at *5–7. Accordingly, our review of the District 
Court’s order will accept as true all of Schuchardt’s plausible 
allegations, and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.5  
                                                 
5 Schuchardt has also challenged on appeal the District 
Court’s order denying his request for a preliminary 




We begin our analysis with first principles. As a 
plaintiff seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction, Schuchardt 
bears the burden of establishing each element of his standing 
to sue under Article III. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). “[T]he irreducible constitutional 
minimum of standing contains three elements.” Id. at 560. 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury 
in fact—an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, 
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of—the injury has to be fairly 
traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not the result of the independent 
action of some third party not before the court. 
Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by 
a favorable decision.  
Id. at 560–61 (internal quotation marks, citations, and 
alterations omitted).  
                                                                                                             
months before granting the Government’s motion to dismiss. 
Because Schuchardt failed to identify that unrelated order in 
his notice of appeal, however, we lack jurisdiction to consider 
his arguments. See Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 
F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010). 
16 
 
Because a motion to dismiss raising a facial attack on 
subject matter jurisdiction relies solely on the pleadings, “we 
apply the same standard of review we use when assessing a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” See Finkelman 
v. NFL, 810 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2016). “Thus, to survive a 
motion to dismiss for lack of standing, a plaintiff must allege 
facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that [he] 
has standing to sue.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
That is, the plaintiff must “plausibly allege facts establishing 
each constitutional requirement.” Hassan v. City of New York, 
804 F.3d 277, 289 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).  
Against this doctrinal backdrop, Schuchardt’s Article 
III standing turns on two inquiries. First, were his allegations 
sufficiently “particularized” to demonstrate that he suffered a 
discrete injury? See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Second, were 
those facts pleaded with enough detail to render them 
plausible, “well-pleaded” allegations entitled to a 
presumption of truth? See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
681 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 
(2007). We address each inquiry in turn. 
A 
A “particularized” Article III injury is one that 
“affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” In re 
Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class 
Action, 678 F.3d 235, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 560 n.1). That putative litigants must suffer in some 
discrete and personal fashion ensures, first, that “the legal 
questions presented . . . will be resolved, not in the rarified 
atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual 
context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the 
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consequences of judicial action,” and, second, that our 
“exercise of judicial power” shows “[p]roper regard for the . . 
. other two coequal branches of the Federal Government.” 
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for the 
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471–74 
(1982). These two concerns—respect for the judicial role and 
separation of powers—are most salient when courts are asked 
“to review actions of the political branches in the fields of 
intelligence gathering and foreign affairs.” Clapper, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1147. 
The Supreme Court has identified a subset of cases in 
which plaintiffs routinely fail to demonstrate particularized 
injury because they present only “generalized grievances,” 
i.e., injuries that are “undifferentiated and ‘common to all 
members of the public.’” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74 (quoting 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974)). 
“Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit on 
standing, the Court has sometimes determined that where 
large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political process, 
rather than the judicial process, may provide the more 
appropriate remedy.” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 
U.S. 11, 23 (1998). Such cases often involve government 
action directed at the public at large, or harms that by their 
nature touch upon interests that are widely shared. See, e.g., 
Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217 (plaintiffs asserting violation of 
the Incompatibility Clause by members of Congress also 
serving in the armed reserves lacked standing because their 
only interest was “to have the Judicial Branch compel the 
Executive Branch to act in conformity with the [law] . . . an 
interest shared by all citizens”); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
U.S. 727, 734–36 (1972) (association challenging 
18 
 
development of national park lacked standing based on 
alleged “special interest” in conservation). 
Nevertheless, “[t]he fact that an injury may be suffered 
by a large number of people does not of itself make that 
injury a nonjusticiable generalized grievance.” Spokeo, 136 S. 
Ct. at 1548 n.7. “The victims’ injuries from a mass tort, for 
example, are widely shared, to be sure, but each individual 
suffers a particularized harm.” Id.; see also Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 n.24 (2007) (“[S]tanding is not to be 
denied simply because many people suffer the same 
injury. . . . To deny standing to persons who are in fact 
injured simply because many others are also injured, would 
mean that the most injurious and widespread Government 
actions could be questioned by nobody.”). And although 
particularity and concreteness are distinct elements 
constituting injury in fact, see Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545, the 
Supreme Court has also observed that the “judicial language” 
accompanying generalized grievances “invariably appears in 
cases where the harm is not only widely shared, but also of an 
abstract or indefinite nature—for example, harm to the 
‘common concern for obedience to law.’” Akins, 524 U.S. at 
23 (emphasis added).  
We applied these principles in a recent case involving 
allegations of government surveillance. In Hassan v. City of 
New York, the plaintiffs claimed that the New York City 
Police Department (NYPD) had implemented a program “to 
monitor the lives of Muslims, their businesses, houses of 
worship, organizations, and schools.” 804 F.3d at 285. The 
program allegedly entailed “widespread” photo and video 
surveillance of “organizations and businesses . . . visibly or 
openly affiliated with Islam,” and the infiltration of “Muslim-
affiliated” groups with informants and undercover police 
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officers. Id. at 285–86. The information gathered was 
compiled into a series of reports “document[ing] . . . 
American Muslim life in painstaking detail.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The Hassan plaintiffs discovered 
the program after some of these reports became “widely 
publicized,” and they asserted that the fallout required them 
to alter their ordinary day-to-day conduct. See id. at 287–88. 
We held that the plaintiffs’ allegations in Hassan were 
sufficient to demonstrate particularized injury under Article 
III. After determining that they had asserted “an invasion of a 
legally protected interest”—“[t]he indignity of being singled 
out [by the government] for special burdens on the basis of 
one’s religious calling”—we observed that the particularized 
nature of an injury does not turn on the number of persons 
that may claim it. Id. at 289. “[T]hat hundreds or thousands 
(or even millions) of other persons may have suffered the 
same injury does not change the individualized nature of the 
asserted rights and interests at stake.” Id. at 291 (citing Akins, 
524 U.S. at 24). “Harm to all—even in the nuanced world of 
standing law—cannot be logically equated with harm to no 
one.” Id. And with regard to allegations of widespread 
government surveillance, we stated that because the plaintiffs 
had “claim[ed] to be the very targets of the allegedly 
unconstitutional surveillance, they [were] unquestionably 
‘affect[ed] . . . in a personal and individual way.’” Id. 
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1). 
Like the plaintiffs in Hassan, Schuchardt has alleged a 
program of government surveillance that, though universal in 
scope, is unmistakably personal in the purported harm. His 
second amended complaint describes PRISM as a dragnet that 
collects “all or substantially all of the e-mail sent by 
American citizens by means of several large internet service 
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providers.” App. 82. The collected information allegedly 
encompasses Schuchardt’s personal communications, and 
includes not only the kind of intensely private details that one 
could reasonably expect to find in the email accounts of most 
Americans—“bank account numbers; credit card numbers; 
passwords for financial data; [and] health records”—but also 
data influenced by Schuchardt’s personal circumstances, 
namely “trade secrets” and “communications with clients of 
Schuchardt’s law firm, which are privileged and confidential 
under applicable law.” App. 96.  
The Government strenuously disputes the plausibility 
of Schuchardt’s assertion that PRISM collects “all or 
substantially all of the e-mail sent by American citizens,” and 
we address that dispute in detail below. But putting aside for 
the moment the question of whether Schuchardt’s allegations 
concerning PRISM are entitled to a presumption of truth, the 
consequences that he identifies as flowing from the 
Government’s alleged dragnet are undoubtedly personal to 
him insofar as he has a constitutional right to maintain the 
privacy of his personal communications, online or otherwise. 
See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2014) 
(“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights . . . which 
may not be vicariously asserted.” (quoting Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). That interest is 
neither indivisibly abstract nor indefinite, see Warshak v. 
United States, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010), and the fact 
that a large percentage of the population may share a similar 
interest “does not change [its] individualized nature” because 
Schuchardt’s allegations make clear that he is among the 
persons that are the “very targets of the allegedly 
unconstitutional surveillance.” Hassan, 804 F.3d at 291; cf. 
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014) 
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(extending the warrant requirement to searches of cellular 
phones, “which are now such a pervasive and insistent part of 
daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude 
they were an important feature of human anatomy”). 
B 
Having determined that Schuchardt’s allegations stated 
a particularized injury under Article III, we now consider 
whether those allegations should be credited as true for the 
purpose of resolving the Government’s jurisdictional 
objection. As noted previously, the District Court construed 
the Government’s motion to dismiss as a facial attack on its 
subject matter jurisdiction. As a result, we must accept 
Schuchardt’s allegations as true, with the important caveat 
that the presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations 
for which there is sufficient “factual matter” to render them 
“plausible on [their] face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Conclusory 
assertions of fact and legal conclusions are not entitled to the 
same presumption. See id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 57; 
Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 
2016) (“Under the pleading regime established by Twombly 
and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint 
must . . . identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more 
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.’” 
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).6 
                                                 
6 We have instructed courts to follow a three-step 
process to determine the sufficiency of a complaint in 
accordance with Twombly and Iqbal. “First, [the court] must 
take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a 
claim. Second, it should identify allegations that, because 




We have recognized that “[t]he plausibility 
determination is a ‘context-specific task that requires the 
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 
common sense.’” See, e.g., Connelly, 809 F.3d at 786–87 
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). At the same time, we have 
cautioned that the plausibility standard does not impose a 
heightened pleading requirement, and that Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8(a) continues to require only a “showing” 
that the pleader is entitled to relief. See, e.g., Phillips v. Cty. 
of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The 
[Supreme] Court emphasized . . . that it was neither 
demanding a heightened pleading of specifics nor imposing a 
probability requirement.”)). Indeed, although Twombly and 
Iqbal emphasized the plaintiff’s burden of pleading sufficient 
“factual matter,” the Supreme Court also expressly 
“disavow[ed]” the requirement that a plaintiff plead “specific 
facts.” Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569, and Erickson v. Pardus, 
551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)).  
Implicit in the notion that a plaintiff need not plead 
“specific facts” to survive a motion to dismiss is that courts 
cannot inject evidentiary issues into the plausibility 
                                                                                                             
assumption of truth. Finally, when there are well-pleaded 
factual allegations, the court should assume their veracity and 
then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an 
entitlement to relief.” Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787 & n.4 




determination.7 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (“[A] well-
pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy 
judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.”). This 
includes the weighing of facts or the requirement that a 
plaintiff plead “specific facts” beyond those necessary to state 
a valid claim. See id. at 573 n.8 (“[W]hen a complaint 
adequately states a claim, it may not be dismissed based on a 
district court’s assessment that the plaintiff will fail to find 
evidentiary support for his allegations or prove his claim to 
the satisfaction of the factfinder.”). The same logic precludes 
a court from rejecting pleaded facts based on some blanket 
exclusion of evidence. See Ricciuti v. New York City Transit 
Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 1991). “A contrary rule 
                                                 
7 The “evidentiary issues” to which we refer are 
distinct from the question of what documents may be 
considered in resolving a motion to dismiss applying the 
standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6), or, as relevant here, 
addressing a facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction 
under Rule 12(b)(1). The general rule for determining the 
scope of the pleadings in this scenario is that a district court 
“may consider only the allegations contained in the 
pleading[s] to determine [their] sufficiency,” but is permitted 
to consider “document[s] integral to or explicitly relied upon 
in the complaint,” and “any undisputedly authentic document 
that a defendant attaches . . . if the plaintiff’s claims are based 
on the document,” without converting the motion into one for 
summary judgment. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liability Litig. 
(No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 133 & n.7 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted). See generally 5B 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 1350 n.1 (3d ed. 2016).   
24 
 
would confuse the principles applicable to a motion to 
dismiss with those governing a motion for summary 
judgment.” Campanella v. Cty. of Monroe, 853 F. Supp. 2d 
364, 378 (W.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Whitney v. Guys, Inc., 
700 F.3d 1118, 1128–29 (8th Cir. 2012). 
Accordingly, although it is unclear whether the District 
Court applied a heightened pleading standard in this case, to 
the extent that its opinion suggests that Schuchardt’s reliance 
on “media reports and other publicly-available information” 
was impermissible, we disagree.8 See Schuchardt, 2015 WL 
5732117, at *6. Indeed, we held that the plaintiffs in Hassan 
had plausibly pleaded both their standing to sue and claims 
for relief based on NYPD surveillance reports that the 
plaintiffs had discovered only after they had been “widely 
publicized.” See 804 F.3d at 287. Similarly, we take the 
                                                 
8 Despite Clapper’s observation that the standing 
inquiry is “especially rigorous” in matters touching on 
“intelligence gathering and foreign affairs,” 133 S. Ct. at 
1147, to our knowledge no court has imposed a heightened 
pleading standard for cases implicating national security. See 
Jewel, 673 F.3d at 913 (“Article III imposes no heightened 
standing requirement for the often difficult cases that involve 
constitutional claims against the executive involving 
surveillance.”). In this appeal, we will assume without 
deciding that a heightened pleading standard does not apply. 
See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212–13 (2007) 
(explaining that “courts should generally not depart from the 
usual practice under the Federal Rules on the basis of 
perceived policy concerns,” including the imposition of a 
pleading standard more stringent than the “short and plain 
statement” of the claim under Rule 8). 
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District Court’s enumeration of the types of evidence giving 
rise to the plaintiffs’ standing in Jewel and ACLU—“a leaked 
FISC order or a detailed insider account”—as merely a 
suggestion of facts that would have strongly supported the 
plausibility of Schuchardt’s allegations, rather than a 
requirement that he plead those specific facts. See 2015 WL 
6732117, at *6. Such limitations on the scope or source of 
facts that a plaintiff may plead to reach the threshold of 
plausibility run counter to the longstanding principles 
animating pretrial dispositions, as set forth in Twombly and 
Iqbal, and come close to the weighing of evidence and 
credibility determinations that are the exclusive province of 
the factfinder. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (“It is the 
conclusory nature of respondent’s allegations, rather than 
their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the 
presumption of truth.”); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (“Rule 
12(b)(6) does not countenance . . . dismissals based on a 
judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations.” 
(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)); see 
also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 
(1986).  
The upshot of all this for Schuchardt is that his 
reliance on news articles and other disclosures concerning 
PRISM weighs neither in his favor nor against him. Instead, 
these public reports (and the leaked classified materials 
accompanying them) are simply part and parcel of the 
“factual matter” that must be considered in assessing the 
plausibility of his allegations. We will therefore examine 
those reports in conjunction with the rest of Schuchardt’s 
pleadings to ascertain whether he plausibly alleged a 




Based on our review of the pleadings, the plausibility 
of Schuchardt’s alleged injury—that the Government has 
been “unlawfully intercepting, accessing, monitoring and/or 
storing [his] private communications,” App. 95—depends on 
the plausibility of his assertion that PRISM functions as an 
indiscriminate dragnet which captures “all or substantially all 
of the e-mail sent by American citizens.” App. 82. Aside from 
this sweeping allegation, Schuchardt has supplied no facts 
suggesting how (or why) the Government would have been 
interested in his online activity. His burden, therefore, was to 
allege enough “factual matter” to make plausible the 
Government’s virtual dragnet. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also 
Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
Schuchardt pleaded facts drawn from news articles 
published by the Guardian, as well as the leaked and 
purportedly classified materials from which those articles 
were derived. As we noted in Part I.B, supra, these 
documents state that the NSA, through PRISM, has obtained 
“direct” access to the technical facilities of several major 
internet service providers. App. 53, 84. They indicate specific 
dates for when those providers granted the Government 
access, App. 60, and that the degree of access those providers 
granted enables the Government to query their facilities at 
will for “real-time interception of an individual’s internet 
activity.” App. 66. They also describe the types of activity 
that may be accessed, encompassing “both the content and 
metadata of . . . private e-mail communications” sent by those 
providers on behalf of their subscribers. App. 59, 96. Finally, 
they claim that the rate of data “[c]ollection is outpacing [the 
Government’s] ability to ingest, process and store [the data] 
to the ‘norms’ to which [it has] become accustomed,” App. 
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64, and that the NSA’s overriding surveillance goal is to 
“[c]ollect it [a]ll,” App. 61. 
By including these factual averments in his second 
amended complaint, Schuchardt outlined a coherent and 
plausible case supporting his PRISM-as-dragnet allegations. 
First, his alleged facts specify, at least to some degree, the 
means through which the NSA captures “all or substantially 
all of the e-mail sent by American citizens,” App. 82, namely, 
by compelling companies that provide email and other 
internet services to cooperate with the NSA in the collection 
of their customers’ data. Although the technical details of 
how each company’s email service integrates within PRISM’s 
infrastructure are not specified, “on a motion to dismiss, we 
‘presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific 
facts that are necessary to support the claim.’” Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 561 (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 
781, 889 (1990)). Moreover, according to the NSA itself, 
PRISM entails data “collection directly from the servers” of 
these companies, and Schuchardt describes events involving 
Lavabit, a company that resisted the Government’s demands 
to “install a device on its server which would have provided 
the [Government] with access to the full content of all e-mail 
messages for all of Lavabit’s . . . customers.” See App. 53, 84, 
87. Thus, the pleaded facts plausibly allege the technical 
means through which PRISM purportedly achieves a 
nationwide email dragnet.9 
                                                 
9 We do not read the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Jewel 
to suggest a different conclusion. To be sure, the plaintiff in 
Jewel was able to allege “with particularity” that her 
communications were seized by “focus[ing]” her complaint 
on interceptions occurring at a specific technical facility 
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Second, Schuchardt’s allegations are replete with 
details confirming PRISM’s operational scope and 
capabilities. The exhibits attached to his second amended 
complaint include a slide from a purported NSA presentation 
identifying company names and the dates they began 
cooperating with the agency. Another slide confirms that—
consistent with a dragnet capturing “all or substantially all of 
the e-mail sent by American citizens”—the scale of the data 
collected by PRISM is so vast that the Government reported 
difficulty processing it according “to the ‘norms’ to which [it 
has] become accustomed.” App. 64; see also App. 52 
(characterizing PRISM as the “SIGAD Used Most in NSA 
Reporting”);10 App. 61 (indicating the NSA’s “New 
Collection Posture” of “Collect[ing] it All”).  
                                                                                                             
operated by a single telecommunications provider. See 673 
F.3d at 910 (discussing the plaintiff’s allegations concerning 
AT&T’s “SG3 Secure Room” and “particular electronic 
communications equipment” at the company’s “Folsom 
Street” facility in San Francisco). Although the details she 
alleged were quite colorful, they differ in degree, not in kind 
from Schuchardt’s averments. In both cases, the parties relied 
on an insider account of the alleged surveillance program at 
issue—Schuchardt on a former NSA contractor, and Jewel on 
a former AT&T telecommunications technician. Those 
insiders in turn have relied either on documentary evidence 
allegedly produced by the Government itself, or their personal 
experiences in executing the surveillance program.  
10 SIGAD stands for the term “Signals Intelligence 
Activity Designator,” which “is an alphanumeric designator 
that identifies a facility used for collecting Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT).” Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and 
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Finally, the pleaded facts support Schuchardt’s 
allegation that the scope of PRISM’s data collection 
encompasses his personal email. The NSA presentation 
identifies specific companies participating in the PRISM 
program, and indicates that NSA analysts receive the content 
of emails collected as part of the program. Schuchardt alleged 
that he uses email services provided by two of those 
companies—Google and Yahoo—so we need not speculate 
about whether Schuchardt’s own communications were 
captured because he specified the scope of PRISM’s dragnet 
with enough “factual matter” to make additional inferential 
leaps unnecessary. See Klayman, 800 F.3d at 559 (opinion of 
Brown, J.) (permitting the inference that the bulk telephone 
metadata program under Section 215 encompassed the 
plaintiff’s communications in light of facts alleging “the 
government’s efforts to ‘create a comprehensive metadata 
database.’”). 
3 
The Government raises three principal arguments 
challenging the plausibility of Schuchardt’s PRISM 
allegations. First, it argues that Clapper and its application by 
the D.C. Circuit in Klayman require us to find his allegations 
implausible. We disagree. 
Two aspects of Clapper distinguish it from this case. 
First, because the Clapper plaintiffs raised a facial 
constitutional challenge to Section 702 on the day the statute 
was enacted, they pleaded only prospective injury, i.e., 
                                                                                                             
the Collection of International Telephone and Internet 
Content, 38 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 117, 119 n.3 (2015). 
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“potential future surveillance.” See 133 S. Ct. at 1150. And 
because that “potential” relied on a “speculative chain of 
possibilities,” the Supreme Court concluded that they had 
failed to satisfy the imminence and traceability elements of 
injury-in-fact under Article III. Here, in contrast, 
Schuchardt’s alleged injury has already occurred insofar as he 
claims the NSA seized his emails. It is therefore not 
surprising that the Government has been unable to formulate 
an analogous “speculative chain” that would doom 
Schuchardt’s constitutional standing.  
Another critical distinction between this case and 
Clapper is that the district court entered summary judgment, a 
procedural posture that required the plaintiffs to identify a 
triable issue of material fact supported by an evidentiary 
record. See id. at 1146, 1149. In contrast, Schuchardt sought 
to avoid dismissal in a facial jurisdictional challenge raised 
under Rule 12(b)(1), which requires him only to state a 
plausible claim, a significantly lighter burden. This distinction 
in the standard of review is also reflected in cases concerning 
national security surveillance from our sister courts. Compare 
ACLU, 785 F.3d at 800 (plaintiffs had standing on motion to 
dismiss); Jewel, 673 F.3d at 906–07 (same), with Klayman, 
800 F.3d at 568 (opinion of Williams, J.) (plaintiffs lacked 
standing to pursue preliminary injunction because there was 
no “substantial likelihood” that they could establish injury-in-
fact, observing that summary judgment imposes a “lighter 
burden” than the “substantial likelihood of success” necessary 
to obtain a preliminary injunction); ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 
644, 650–51, 667–70 (6th Cir. 2007) (plaintiffs failed to 
establish injury-in-fact on summary judgment because they 
had “no evidence” on various points of causation). Here, 
Schuchardt has gone beyond mere allegations to survive a 
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motion to dismiss by creating a limited evidentiary record to 
support his allegations.  
The Government’s reliance on Klayman is also 
misplaced. There, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s 
preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to 
demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. 
See 800 F.3d at 561. However, the panel split on the issue of 
the plaintiffs’ standing, and also disagreed on whether to 
remand the case for further proceedings or outright dismissal. 
See id. at 564 (opinion of Brown, J.) (plaintiffs had satisfied 
“the bare requirements of standing,” remanding for 
jurisdictional discovery); id. at 565 (opinion of Williams, J.) 
(plaintiffs lacked standing to seek preliminary injunction, 
remanding for jurisdictional discovery); id. at 569 (opinion of 
Sentelle, J.) (plaintiffs lacked standing vel non, remanding 
with order to dismiss). Under these circumstances, it seems 
clear to us that Klayman’s persuasive force is minimized by 
its splintered reasoning, different procedural posture, and the 
fact that the D.C. Circuit addressed itself to a now-defunct 
surveillance program authorized by a separate provision of 
FISA. Accordingly, neither Clapper nor Klayman supports 
the Government in this case. 
Second, the Government contends that Schuchardt’s 
allegations “say at most that the government may have the 
capability to seize and store most electronic 
communications,” but “[t]hey do not say that the government 
is searching or seizing most, let alone all, e-mail.” Gov’t Br. 
21. We agree that Schuchardt’s alleged facts—even if 
proven—do not conclusively establish that PRISM operates 
as a dragnet on the scale he has alleged. The language of the 
leaked materials Schuchardt relies on is imprecise. The use of 
the term “direct” in the NSA’s presentation could mean, for 
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example, that the Government has complete discretion to 
search all electronic information held by a company 
participating in PRISM at will; this would certainly be 
consistent with the “real-time” interception capability that the 
NSA allegedly possesses, and could qualify as an 
unconstitutional “seizure” of all information stored on the 
company’s servers. On the other hand, “direct” could mean 
that the Government merely has the legal authority to compel 
participating companies to turn over “communications that 
may be of foreign-intelligence value because they are . . . 
associated with the e-mail addresses that are used by 
suspected foreign terrorists.” Gov’t Br. 22. In that scenario, it 
is implausible that Schuchardt’s communications would be 
targeted by PRISM. 
At this early stage of litigation, however, Schuchardt is 
entitled to any inference in his favor that may be “reasonably” 
drawn from his pleaded facts. See, e.g., King Drug Co. of 
Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 
398 n.11 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79). 
And as we have explained, the inference that PRISM 
“collects all or substantially all of the e-mail sent by 
American citizens,” App. 82, is one supported by his pleaded 
“factual matter.” Accordingly, in this procedural posture, we 
cannot accept the Government’s preferred inference. 
Finally, the Government disputes the notion that 
PRISM is a dragnet, i.e., that it is “based on the 
indiscriminate collection of information in bulk.” See Gov’t 
Br. 22 (quoting PCLOB Report at 111). According to the 
Government, “the program consists entirely of targeting 
specific persons that may be of foreign-intelligence value 
because they are, for example, associated with the e-mail 
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addresses that are used by suspected foreign terrorists.” Id. 
Under this view, to intercept communications using PRISM: 
Analysts first identify a non-U.S. person located 
outside the United States who is likely to 
communicate certain types of foreign 
intelligence information, such as an individual 
who belongs to a foreign terrorist organization 
or facilitates its activities. Analysts also attempt 
to identify a means by which this foreign target 
communicates, such as an e-mail address, or a 
telephone number; any such address, number, 
or other identifier is known as a “selector.” 
PRISM collection occurs when the government 
obtains from telecommunications providers . . .  
communications sent to or from specified 
selectors.  
Gov’t Br. 6–7 (internal citations omitted). 
Several commentators11 and the few courts12 that have 
examined PRISM appear to agree with the Government’s 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 8, at 119 n.2 (“Once 
foreign intelligence acquisition has been authorized under 
Section 702, the government sends written directives to 
electronic communication service providers compelling their 
assistance in the acquisition of communications.” (quoting 
PCLOB Report at 7)); Nathan Alexander Sales, 
Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts 
on the NSA Controversy, 10 I/S: J. L. & Pol’y for Info. Soc’y 
523, 526 (2014) (“[In] PRISM . . . the NSA targets specific 
non-Americans who are reasonably believed to be located 
outside the country, and also engages in bulk collection of 
34 
 
view of the program’s “targeted” nature. So too has the 
PCLOB, whose report on PRISM the Government has asked 
us to consider. See PCLOB Report at 33–34. These 
authorities are substantial, and if correct, would tend to 
                                                                                                             
some foreign-to-foreign communications that happen to be 
passing through telecommunications infrastructure in the 
United States.”). The Washington Post also amended its 
initial report on PRISM to suggest that “imprecision on the 
part of the NSA” in the wording of its presentation left open 
the possibility that PRISM collection still required the agency 
to request materials from the participating companies, rather 
than directly from the companies’ servers. See Jonathan Hall, 
Washington Post Updates, Hedges on Initial PRISM Report, 
Forbes (June 7, 2013, 9:08 PM), https://perma.cc/7L6A-
H22D.  
12 See, e.g., United States v. Hasbajrami, 2016 WL 
1029500, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2016) (“In PRISM 
collection, the government identifies the user accounts it 
wants to monitor and sends a ‘selector’—a specific 
communications facility, such as a target’s email address or 
telephone number—to the relevant communications service 
provider. A government directive then compels the 
communications service provider to give it communications 
sent to or from that selector (i.e., the government ‘tasks’ the 
selector).” (internal citations omitted)); Wikimedia Found. v. 
NSA, 143 F. Supp. 3d 344, 348–49 (D. Md. 2015) (“Under a 
surveillance program called ‘PRISM,’ U.S.-based Internet 
Service Providers furnish the NSA with electronic 




undermine Schuchardt’s ability to show that his own 
electronic communications were seized by the PRISM 
program. 
The problem for the Government at this stage is that 
the scope of materials that a court may consider in evaluating 
a facial jurisdictional challenge raised in a motion under Rule 
12(b)(1) is not unconstrained. As with motions under Rule 
12(b)(6), the court is limited to the four corners of the 
complaint, “document[s] integral to or explicitly relied upon 
in the complaint,” and “any undisputedly authentic document 
that a defendant attaches . . . if the plaintiff’s claims are based 
on the document.” In re Asbestos Prods. Liability Litig. (No. 
VI), 822 F.3d 125, 133 & n.7 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d 
Cir. 1997)). Schuchardt’s pleadings are in no way “based on” 
any countervailing authorities that support the Government’s 
position, nor are those authorities integral to or explicitly 
relied upon by his complaint—accordingly, we must ignore 
their persuasive value, whatever it may be, at this stage of the 
litigation. See Gould Elecs., 220 F.3d at 176. Likewise, 
insofar as the Government’s arguments present new 
information disagreeing with the factual premises underlying 
Schuchardt’s claims, we cannot consider them in this facial 
jurisdictional challenge, the sole purpose of which is to test 
the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s jurisdictional 
averments. Instead, disagreements concerning jurisdictional 
facts should be presented in a factual challenge, at which time 
the court, after allowing the plaintiff “to respond with 
evidence supporting jurisdiction,” may fully adjudicate the 
parties’ dispute, including the resolution of any questions of 




Our decision today is narrow: we hold only that 
Schuchardt’s second amended complaint pleaded his standing 
to sue for a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. This does not 
mean that he has standing to sue, as the Government remains 
free upon remand to make a factual jurisdictional challenge to 
Schuchardt’s pleading. In anticipation of such a challenge, we 
provide the following guidance to the District Court on 
remand. 
Schuchardt has suggested that he is entitled to 
jurisdictional discovery. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 
40–41, Schuchardt v. Obama, No. 15-3491 (3d Cir. May 17, 
2016). We leave that question to the District Court’s 
discretion with the caveat that “jurisdictional discovery is not 
available merely because the plaintiff requests it.” Lincoln 
Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 108 n.38 
(3d Cir. 2015). Jurisdictional discovery is not a license for the 
parties to engage in a “fishing expedition,” id., and that fact is 
particularly true in a case like this one, which involves 
potential issues of national security. In this very context, the 
Supreme Court has cautioned that jurisdictional discovery—
even if conducted in camera—cannot be used to probe the 
internal (and most likely classified) workings of the  national 
security apparatus of the United States. See Clapper, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1149 n.4 (“[T]his type of hypothetical disclosure 
proceeding would allow a terrorist (or his attorney) to 
determine whether he is currently under U.S. surveillance 
simply by filing a lawsuit challenging the Government’s 
surveillance program.”). For that reason, the District Court 
should take care to circumscribe the scope of discovery and 
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any ex parte and in camera procedures to only the factual 
questions necessary to determine its jurisdiction.13  
Finally, nothing in our opinion should be construed to 
preclude the Government from raising any applicable 
privileges barring discovery—including the state secrets 
doctrine—or to suggest how the District Court should rule on 
any privilege the Government may choose to assert. See 
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953). 
* * * 
For the stated reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order dismissing Schuchardt’s second amended 
complaint and remand for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
                                                 
13 For example, the linchpin of Schuchardt’s standing 
is his allegation that PRISM collects “all or substantially all 
of the e-mail sent by American citizens.” The District Court 
may wish to consider what discovery is necessary for it to 
adjudicate the veracity of that allegation while permitting 
Schuchardt an adequate evidentiary response. See also Jewel 
v. NSA, 2015 WL 545925, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2015) 
(holding that plaintiffs had failed to establish their standing to 
challenge Upstream, another putative NSA electronic 
surveillance program, because “the evidence at summary 
judgment [was] insufficient to establish that the Upstream 
collection process operates in the manner in which Plaintiffs 
allege[d] it does”). 
